The Office of the Prime Minister and the Presidency in Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Systems: A Comparative Constitutional Study with Special Reference to Mauritius.
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Abstract
The constitutional allocation of executive power is a key element of democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law. Modern-day constitutional democracies often apply either parliamentary, presidential, or semi-presidential systems of government. The abovementioned systems, however, rely on different institutional arrangements which allow for the equitable distribution of control over the executive power among the government’s various branches. Although academic literature exists on this topic, the studies conducted query why lawmakers in different Westminister-inspired constitutional democracies create their own executive institutions in order to fit them in unique political and socio-cultural contexts. The article in question aims to fill in this research gap by either conducting a comparative doctrinal study to see how Mauritius, India, UK, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, France, and Romania use executive power in their constitution. The study utilizes a qualitative doctrinal and comparative constitutional research methodology where the main focus is on constitutional texts, judicial rulings, constitutional conventions, and important scholarly writings to discern the linkages among the Head of State, Head of Government, and Parliament in various constitutional frameworks. The study mainly concentrates on the transition of Mauritius from a constitutional monarchy into a parliamentary republic and President as a keeper of constitutional law in the Westminster-style executive structure. The research indicates that the success of the executive in implementing its legislative functions is not simply defined by the formal constitutional system but also by the interaction of constitutional conventions, judicial decisions, parliamentary accountability, and implications of constitutional conventions.According to the research, constitutional resilience is deepened where executive powers are constrained by institutional limitations, screen mechanisms, and democratic legitimacy. In addition, according to the study, the introduction of constitutional conventions, the explanation of presidential discretionary powers, as well as the building of bi-partisan mechanisms of selection of a head of the state may influence positively constitutional accountability in parliamentary democracies. By giving a theoretical explanation and applying practical methods, this article will help modern researchers in the field of constitutional studies.....
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Constitutional Documents
● Constitution of Barbados, 2021.
● Constitution of India, 1950.
● Constitution of Mauritius, 1968 (as amended).
● Constitution of Romania, 1991 (as amended).
● Constitution of the French Fifth Republic, 1958.
● Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, 1976.
Important Judicial Decisions
● Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (HL).
● Hinds v. The Queen [1977] AC 195 (PC).
● Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
● Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (India).
● The State v. Khoyratty [2006] UKPC 13...