

Navigating the AI Duopoly: India's Quest for Digital Sovereignty and Algorithmic Governance in a US–China Dominated Global Order..

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Abstract

Capability in advanced artificial intelligence (AI) has been centralized in the United States and China (Leech et al., 2024), creating an extremely uneven distribution of power across the globe, which is just as important as a country's military or economic power in determining its political agency, with access to foundational models, semiconductor supply chains, and large-scale training data serving as a key determinant. The problem is not just a technical one for states outside the duopoly, but one of sovereignty. This paper explores the unique trajectory being taken by the world's most populous democracy and its rapidly growing digital economy in the face of an increasingly polarized AI landscape. The study, which uses qualitative policy analysis tools, suggests that structurally India is strong enough to stop being subjugated by technology but not robust enough to be algorithmically self-sufficient, given the current state of its governance structures, from 2018's National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence to the IndiaAI Mission (Chahal et al., 2021) and the India AI Governance Guidelines written in November 2025. The Indian approach to diplomacy, exemplified at the India AI Impact Summit in February 2026 in New Delhi, is an intentional shift in the global discussion of AI governance to put development equity and human-centric priorities at the heart of the discussion. India's principled non-alignment, thus, manifests in a digital manner, by involving both Washington and Beijing simultaneously while advancing a third path alternative for the Global South. However, significant issues are still not resolved: there is a significant leaning towards voluntary corporate compliance, foundational model capacity is still developing and stated data-sovereignty aspirations do not easily fit with substantial reliance on the external cloud infrastructure. The paper argues that the trajectory of algorithmic governance is more a diplomatic negotiation than a policy stance in India and is as much a result of internal institutional fragmentation as it is of power dynamics with the outside world....

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence Governance; Digital Sovereignty; India AI Policy; US–China AI Competition; Algorithmic Governance; Technology Diplomacy; Global South; Middle-Power Strategy; Equity; Ethics..

Introduction

In less than 10 years, AI has gone from being a niche area of computer science to a new geopolitical front. Those two powers today control the abilities that are most important: training large foundational models, the development of advanced semiconductors, and the curation of the huge data sets needed to support modern machine learning (Steinhoff, 2022). The U.S. has the cutting-edge of the new model building and the design of the most sophisticated chips; China has scale, state-directed investment, and has a fast-maturing domestic ecosystem (Xie & Avila, 2024). Together, these two states create what this paper refers to as an “AI duopoly,” an environment in which the algorithmic power infrastructure is owned, managed, and challenged by very few other countries.

In most of the world and particularly in the Global South countries, this concentration presents a problem with respect to traditional development policy classifications. The situation is not just that a poorer or middle-income

country is late to adopt a new technology as in the past it was late for electrification or industrial automation. Yet the technology in question now increasingly influences governance, business, public debate and even national security. It is a surrender of a degree of sovereignty over the informational substrate of the modern state to rely exclusively on foreign models, foreign chips, and foreign cloud platforms. It is on this conceptual field that scholars have been starting to chart, under the guise of ‘digital sovereignty’ (Couture & Toupin, 2019), (Floridi, 2020).

India is an extraordinarily pedagogical case (Carter & Hermansen, 2026). It is at once an immense consumer market for AI products, an important exporter of technological talent (Carter & Hermansen, 2026), a democracy with constitutional guarantees of equality and due process, and a self-proclaimed voice of the Global South (Alam, 2025). In short, it is not an isolated state lacking clout, nor a peer to Washington and Beijing. It is in a grey area. Its main concern is the problem of whether and how such an agency is available to states who do not control the underlying infrastructure, specifically: How does a power so situated try to make structural disadvantage into strategic agency?

The question directly addresses the ethical and equity issues that underpin debates on technology and order today. Governance of AI is not simply about regulating it, but it is a matter of global justice, who benefits, who is at risk, and who is given a say in setting the rules of the game. India has been trying to reorient the international conversation in precisely these directions, most recently at the India AI Impact Summit in New Delhi in February 2026, when the event was titled “AI for development and impact” as opposed to “AI safety” (Semaladhari, 2026).

The paper is in five sections. It starts by placing the argument in the academic debates on digital sovereignty, AI nationalism and middle power technology diplomacy. It then outlines the qualitative methodology based on documents. The findings section maps the structural asymmetry of the AI duopoly, the trajectory of India's policy architecture from 2018 to 2025, the nature of the AI governance structure in November 2025, the diplomatic implications of the 2026 Summit, and the unresolved tensions and trade-offs that will limit India's sovereignty claims. A discussion section takes the theory of principled non-alignment as digital statecraft further, before the conclusion reflects on the implications of the Indian case for the other states that are not part of the dominant bloc.

2. Literature Review

The paper builds on and aims to link three streams of research that have mostly grown independent of each other: the scholarship on digital and technological sovereignty; the new scholarship on AI nationalism and great-power technology rivalry; and the middle-power and non-alignment theory in international relations.

2.1 Digital and technological sovereignty

In a very rapid expansion, digital sovereignty is contested by a variety of actors, from States to social movements up to corporations, and is interpreted in different terms, from data localisation to popular self-determination, as a condition of political sovereignty for polities like the European Union (Pohle & Thiel, 2020). A counter-tradition questions the narrative of sovereignty and exists as a sceptical warning that the rhetoric of sovereignty would risk breaking the global internet and that it could be used to legitimise state control rather than empower citizens. The conflict between sovereignty as empowerment and sovereignty as a means of centralised power is continued throughout the Indian analysis.

2.2 AI nationalism, duopoly.

This is where the Chinese approach to AI really becomes interesting, the “AI nationalism,” that is the idea that AI is now being integrated into the strategic calculus of states (Goode, 2020), and the competing regulatory “empires,” the United States, China and the EU, represent different styles of governance, market, state and rights, respectively (Beaumier & Gjesvik, 2025), and India is a large but non-dominant country, so what template does it fit into?

2.3 Middle powers, non-alignment and Indian statecraft

The third literature is about India's unique approach to foreign policy, “multialignment,” involves the development of overlapping alliances and constitutes an explicitly post-non-aligned vision (Hall, 2016), where India pursued an alliance of all major powers with a basis in issue-specific interest. places these in the longer-term context of India's quest for strategic autonomy. The question that this literature has not fully theorized is how this autonomy is enacted in the technological as opposed to the territorial or alliance-based realm in which the resources in question

are not territory or alliances but compute, data, and models. The current study fills in that lacuna by taking the logic of “multi-alignment” into the algorithmic realm.

Lastly, a new and expanding policy-studies literature on AI governance highlights the iterative, contested, and framing-driven nature of governance for contested emerging technologies. This understanding is the basis upon which the central argument of the paper is delivered: algorithmic governance in India is a process of negotiation, and not a doctrine.

3. Methodology

The method used in this research is a qualitative interpretive method with documentary research approach. This is appropriate since the research question relates to meaning, framing, and strategic intent rather than measurement of quantifiable variables. The analysis is carried out using close reading and thematic coding of primary and secondary materials gathered in a purposeful way.

The primary corpus consists of official Indian policy documents and rationales, such as the IndiaAI Mission (Malik et al., n.d.). These are not just statements of policy, but also performative acts of self-presentation in an international arena.

The secondary corpus consists of peer-reviewed scholarship and sound analytical interpretations that were employed in forming a conceptual structure and for triangulation of interpretation. Sources were chosen for their relevance, authority and timeliness, and were prioritised for those published from 2018 to 2026 to ensure they reflected the policy trajectory in its entirety.

An iterative thematisation was used for analysis. An initial reading generated a set of analytic themes structural asymmetry, indigenous capability, regulatory philosophy, diplomatic framing, and internal contradiction which were then refined against the corpus. The study does not claim the national generalisability of the findings; it is an interpretive and theory building study. It is recognised that there are two limitations: first, the analysis is based on publicly available documents and therefore does not reflect the internal deliberation and informal bargaining that occurs; second, the analysis is a snapshot of a moving target, with the policy field evolving rapidly and hence the analysis is current to early 2026.

4. Findings and Analysis

4.1 The AI duopoly and the architecture of asymmetry

The first, and most important, discovery is structural. The current power of AI is based on three of its precious and unevenly distributed assets: high-end graphics processor power, the ability to manufacture them; enormous volumes of high-quality training data; and the capital and talent to build frontier foundational models. In each of these areas, the U.S. and China have an overwhelming advantage (Imbrie et al., 2020). Instead of a level playing field that allows latecomers to slowly catch up, this is a layered dependency, with most states relying on AI advances as being delivered by infrastructure designed, owned, and controlled by one of two dominant powers. India's dependency is real because while local skills improve, much of the compute and cloud infrastructure that Indian developers use is being provided by partnerships with foreign hardware and platform vendors (Chahal et al., 2021). But this asymmetry is not just economic, it is infrastructural, and it is infrastructural dependence that most directly limits sovereign control of algorithmic systems.

4.2 The policy trajectory of India, 2018-2025: Aspirations to architecture

The response of India has changed significantly over 7 years. The 2018 National Strategy on Artificial Intelligence (NSAI, ‘AIForAll’) by the NITI Aayog was mostly aspirational, with priority sectors identified as healthcare, agriculture, education, smart mobility and urban infrastructure, and a vision of AI as a means of inclusive development, but no major financial promises or institutional framework for delivery (Aayog, 2018). It wasn't a mere ability; it was a vision.

The Mission on IndiaAI's launch and scale changed aspiration to architecture. The IndiaAI Mission shifted from aspiration to architecture with an investment of around ₹10,372 crore (US\$1.2 billion) in 2024 to build an indigenous compute ecosystem, encompassing common compute, foundational models, datasets, application development, skilling, and safe-and-trusted AI (Bureau, 2025). By mid-2025, it scaled to over 34,000 GPUs, with a target of 38,000 by year-end, available to researchers at subsidized rates (Bureau, 2025). The government also facilitated the growth of indigenous, multilingual large language models, with a sovereign model based on Indian

data planned for the 2026 Summit(Semaladhari, 2026). In early 2026, a developer published a 105-billion-parameter model, trained on domestic infrastructure and supporting twenty-two official languages, as a step towards 'foundational independence'(Standard, 2026). These are serious steps to deal with the compute and model parts of the above asymmetry.

But it shows the possibilities of catch-up too. India joined the frontier model development late, its indigenous capacity in this space was rapidly growing, but it was still in the early stages of maturity compared to the incumbents; and relying on foreign partnerships for compute hardware to service even MFI-priced compute further illustrated that India's course of action was material autonomy, not material autonomy achieved.

4.3 Guidelines for Governance: November 2025 - light touch sovereignty

In November 2025, the India AI Governance Guidelines were issued by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), which was the culmination of India's unique approach to regulation (MeitY, 2025). There are three key features. First, the framework explicitly does not have a standalone AI Act, but rather aims to regulate AI through adaptation of existing laws, including the Information Technology Act, the Digital Personal Data Protection Act and provisions in consumer law and criminal law, as well as through widespread application of voluntary, techno-legal measures. This framework has been characterized as a "light-touch" regime, emphasizing guidance and innovation over statutory obligations and restriction(Choudhary & George, 2025),(MeitY, 2025).

Second, the Guidelines elaborate a set of guiding principles, or "sutras" as they have been called, which include trust, a people-first attitude, innovation over restraint, fairness and equity, accountability, comprehensibility by design, and safety, resilience and sustainability. These principles are inspired by the RBI's report on responsible AI in the financial sector (India, 2025), which shows a sectorally networked model of governance, not a single, central code of governance.

Third, the framework also outlines coordinating institutions (in particular, a new group of coordination within the AI governance committee chaired by the Principal Scientific Adviser) with binding enforcement done by the existing sectoral regulators. The guiding metaphor is coherence with no new main controller. The meaning of this design is double edged with respect to the sovereignty question. On the other hand, the light-touch model has been seen as practical and not being likely to stifle innovations, and India has opted for a rights-respecting and innovation-friendly approach in comparison to more intrusive regulatory models in other countries, although there are areas that need attention in consumer protection and institutional capacity (Hindu, 2025). On the other hand, a system based on mutual agreement by companies puts a lot of faith in the very same tech giants that the sovereignty movement seeks to challenge many of which are based overseas.

4.4 Diplomacy as digital statecraft" is the theme for the 2026 AI Impact Summit.

The theme of the 2026 AI Impact Summit is Diplomacy as digital statecraft". In February 2026, the India AI Impact Summit in Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi, focused on the third and most unique aspect of the frame: discourse. The Summit marked the fourth occurrence of a global AI Summit since Bletchley Park, Seoul and Paris, and the first by a Global South country, an event that was agenda-setting (PIB, 2026). The name was a clear statement of a reframing, away from the emphasis on 'safety' of its predecessors and towards 'impact', based on the three principles of People, Planet, and Progress.

This was supported by the substantive outcomes. At the end of the day, 88 countries and international organisations endorsed a New Delhi Declaration and a Global AI Impact Commons project aimed at increasing access to compute, datasets, and models in developing countries was launched; the day's proceedings highlighted the experience of the Government of India with population-scale identity and payment systems as a blueprint for inclusive use of AI (PIB, 2026). The Summit was thus a "digital statecraft" an attempt to "transpose" the "convening power and developmental narrative" of India into norms that will shape a technology where India has no real control.

This diplomatic triumph was far from flawless. The Summit's shortcomings were highlighted, as well as doubts over whether there will be long-term substance behind headline pledges(Semaladhari, 2026). But, for the current debate, it is not the specific outcomes of the Summit but the method that is, how India has sought leverage which is more important.

4.5 The un-resolved tensions: the limits of sovereignty.

The fourth finding is that there is a contradiction in India's sovereignty project within itself and on at least three counts. First, there is a compliance gap: a governance model based on voluntary, light-touch measures would work only if dominant and/or foreign firms would want to comply, whereas the stated goal is to lessen the need for external dependence. Secondly, is a gap in capacity, indigenous foundational-model capacity, which is progressing but as yet not at the frontier, so that the rhetoric of sovereign models outpaces the material reality. Third, there is an infrastructure deficit: the stated data-sovereignty objectives exist alongside widespread use of foreign cloud platforms and imported hardware, and the substrate of "sovereign" AI is, essentially, heavily dependent on foreign sources. These tensions are compounded by internal institutional fragmentation governance responsibility distributed across multiple ministries and sectoral regulators which complicates the projection of a single coherent national strategy.

5. Discussion: Principled Non-Alignment as Digital Statecraft

These results together back up the paper's main claim of interpretation. India's stance seems to be a continuation of its foreign policy tradition of non-alignment, which has since been revised by recent scholarship into the term multialignment (Subrahmanyam, 2020), (Hall, 2016). This paper extends that concept to the algorithmic domain. India's digital statecraft is doing something similar: using American technology, technology investment, and cutting-edge studies, it is expanding to beckon both Washington and Beijing, while rhetorically claiming to be a leader of the Global South rather than a junior partner of either superpower.

Aside from being pragmatic, there is something "normative" about this posture which is what makes the term "principled non-alignment" fitting. India is not just about hedging; it's about championing developmental equity, human-centred AI, democratising access to compute and the dignity of the Global South as a rule-maker, not a rule-taker. Indian commentary has started to view this as a "sovereign and human-centric" endeavor aimed at leading the global conversation around responsible and inclusive AI (George et al., 2026). It's here that the issues of equity and ethics that drive this conference come to the fore. India's approach redefines the policies of AI governance as an issue of justice, whether the fruits of this transformative technology are widely distributed or concentrated in a few hands, and whether the rules that will govern them will be broadly accepted or claimed to be theirs.

But the analysis also dampens any triumphalism. Structurally constrained is who principled non-alignment is. India's strength lies in the fact that it cannot compete with the incumbents on raw capability, that is why it competes on norms, narrative, convening. Whether such discursive force can be maintained, and whether such force can be turned into enduring material gain or merely as a trade-off for its loss is an open and unanswered question. Finally, the honest answer is that the algorithmic governance of India is not a settled matter, but a continuous negotiation, happening in parallel to a battle for power with an outside force and a battle for power with an inside force.

6. Conclusion

The paper aimed to explore the strategy for digital sovereignty and algorithmic governance for India, as a large non-dominant state, in the context of a US–China duopoly on AI. The analysis gives you a multi-level response. India is structurally limited in its infrastructure, with its compute, data and models being localized in two competing powers (Chahal et al., 2021). On a strategic level, it has acted on three fronts: it has developed capability in the field of building materials through IndiaAI Mission (Bansal & Jain, 2023), it has put forward a light-touch philosophy in the Governance Guidelines (November 2025) (Agarwal & Nene, 2026), it has challenged the global discourse through the 2026 AI Impact Summit (Semaladhari, 2026). In an interpretatory sense, these gestures are principled non-alignment: the coming together of India's multialignment worldview into the algorithmic domain, and of hard-headed hedging in tandem with a substantive moral idea of developmental equity for the Global South.

It's two-fold as a contribution. The paper is a work of empirical integration of India's policy process on AI from 2018 to 2026, where capability-building and regulation and diplomacy are typically treated as distinct activities. It is an idea of principled non-alignment as digital statecraft that it proposes as a lens to explore the agency of middle powers in a space that they do not control, but whose underlying infrastructure they do.

The overarching message transcends India. The agency that is not in the direct command of the two giants may have some actual weight and substance, but it may be exercised through norms, coalitions and narrative, not capability. The key question this paper does not answer for the many countries in the Global South who are observing India's experiment is whether bounded agency can, over time, change the distribution of algorithmic power, or is it a clever way to get over an asymmetry that it cannot overcome? The strategic and ethical dimensions will be key in shaping the future of AI governance on the international stage.

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